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INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Melinda Watson, appeals a final order issued by the Second
Judicial District Court, which dismissed a protective order issued by the
Commissioner. Melinda should prevail because the judge misapplied Civil Rule
108 and she was denied a fair hearing.
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD
I.

Whether the judge erred in allowing a videotape and new emails to be
introduced during the second part of an evidentiary hearing (which
occurred thirty days after the first evidentiary hearing), when the
evidence was never given to the other party prior to the second
hearing, and the offering party had not moved to introduce the

evidence prior to the second hearing. The standard of review for a
question of law is de novo. Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT
121, 63 P.3d 80. Melinda preserved this objection by citing to Rule
108 and indicating that these surprise exhibits violated the rule and
due process. R. 160-61, R. 556, l. 17-24, R. 557, l. 14-25, R. 558, l.
1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25.
II.

Assuming the wrongful evidence is excluded, whether the protective
order should be reinstated? The proper interpretation of a statute is a
question of law, and the review is for correctness. Baird v. Baird,
2014 UT 2008, 322 P.3d 728, 733. The issue was preserved because
the Court considered and ruled on the statutory requirements for
stalking. R. 581, l. 21-25; R. 582, l. 1-10.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The District Court granted Melinda’s petition for an ex-parte protective
order on November 15, 2018. After a hearing held on December 5, 2018, before
Commissioner Morgan, he entered a detailed, written, recommended ruling and
entered the protective order on December 17, 2018. Michael filed an untimely
appeal on December 31, 2018. Utah Code § 78B-7-107(f). Preliminarily, the
2

judge ruled as a policy matter that whether Michael had filed an objection in a
timely manner was inconsequential because (to the effect) judges are supposed to
try cases. R. 150. The evidentiary hearing proceeded, and Judge Edwards
conducted it on two days rather than one due to Michael’s lawyer showing up very
late on the day of the first hearing. Michael’s lawyer had scheduled two matters
on the same day and could not arrive at the time appointed by Judge Edwards in
this matter. The first day of the evidentiary hearing was held on February 28,
2019. There was only enough time for Melinda to present her evidence. Thirty
days later at a second evidentiary hearing held on March 28, 2019, Michael
presented his evidence. However, without moving to introduce new evidence,
Michael introduced evidence of a videotape, a text, and emails, which had never
been presented to the Commissioner, nor ever served on Melinda’s counsel. Over
Melinda’s objection, the undisclosed evidence was the dispositive evidence in the
judge’s decision to dismiss the protective order. R. 585, l. 21-25; R. 586, l. 1-21.
2. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Melinda was involved in a car accident, was severely injured, suffered
traumatic brain injury, wears wrist braces, and has been advised not to lift objects
over five pounds. R. 158, l. 11-16; R. 159, l. 21-25, R. 160, l. 1-7. Due to her
3

injury, Melinda is unable to defend herself by hitting someone back, pushing
someone away, or removing someone’s arms from her presence. R. 159, l. 18-19;
R. 160, l. 12 - R. 162, l. 3-8. In a special master’s order, he ordered the parties to
remain in their residences during transfers, and Michael failed to do so. R. 165, l.
15-23. In fact on one occasion, Michael left his residence, videotaped Melinda,
and walked a few feet away from her vehicle. R. 167, l. 16-21. Melinda was
frightened. R. 167, l. 24. Michael’s body language was menacing. R. 167, l. 2425; R. 168, l. 1-6. Melinda had the parties’ 16-year-old daughter with her in her
vehicle. R. 168, l. 14-18. On other occasions during exchanges, Michael would
record or photograph Melinda and/or the children. R. 155-56; R. 169, l. 1-6.
Michael also blocked the driveway preventing Melinda from leaving repeatedly
during exchanges. R. 169, l. 13; R. 191, l. 16-25; R. 192, l. 1-7. Michael also
would follow Melinda around a soccer field where she was coaching and
photograph her and interrogate her. R. 169, l. 21-25, R. 170, l. 1-2. Other parents
at the soccer practice would approach Melinda to check on her safety, and she felt
frightened. R. 171, l. 15-20. These stalking episodes would last between 10 - 15
minutes. R. 171, l. 23, Ex. 2. Michael also would attend her ten-year old son’s
soccer games and approach and record Melinda. R. 172, l. 15-17. Melinda was
frightened because Michael would yell at her, record her, and accuse her of
4

stealing things. R. 173, l. 5-13. Melinda had told Michael to stop stalking her
about 6-12 times, but he ignored her requests. R. 174, l. 24-25, R. 175, l. 1-2.
Melinda told Michael that his behaviors frightened her. R. 175, l. 9. The divorce
decree also contained a restraining order for the parties not to harass each other.
R. 176, l. 1-2. Melinda testified that Michael had placed her in fear previously
when he slammed his fists on her vehicle’s roof. Melinda called the police and
presented a police report as evidence to corroborate her statement. R. 178, l. 1225; R. 179, l. 1-15. Melinda argued that because the police report had been
presented to the Commissioner and not objected to, the Court could take judicial
notice of it. R. 180, l. 3-9. The judge denied consideration of any police report
that had been presented to the Commissioner. R. 1180, l. 18. Michael had also
assaulted Melinda by shoving her so forcefully that she fell backwards. R. 182, l.
5-12. Michael had also screamed at her, called her a “fucking bitch,” punched
objects close to her, screamed at and frightened the parties’ teen-aged daughter.
R. 184. l. 11-25, p. 54-55. On another occasion when Melinda merely greeted the
parties’ young son at an event and gave him a hug, Michael called the police and
shoved her. R. 157, l. 24-25, R. 188-89, l. 1-8. A police report had been presented
to the Commissioner and Melinda used it to cross-examine Michael. However, the
Court would not allow the report substantively. At a children’s extracurricular
5

activity Michael approached Melinda in a threatening manner to the point where
she hid from him in a closet. R. 190, l. 10-25, R. 191, l. 1-15. A police report was
also used in the manner specified. Michael also participated in voyeurism by
taking photos of women’s butts, photographing Melinda naked (without her
consent), and then downloading Melinda’s photo to his computer. R. 194, l. 3-25,
R. 195-97, R. 198, l. 1-12.
During cross-examination, Melinda was asked why she had not sought a
protective order earlier. Melinda testified that she had consulted with a victim’s
advocate earlier. However, she was not certain as to whether she could have
obtained a protective order because she did not have a bruise. R. 206, l. 14-25, p.
R. 207, l. 1-2. Michael’s attorney hypothesized, over Melinda’s counsel’s
objection as to relevance and Utah R. Evid. 404(b), that Melinda was seeking a
protective order in retaliation for sanctions that had been imposed upon her earlier
by retired Judge Allphin (when Melinda had been represented by counsel through
the Utah State Bar’s Modest Means program, who had no prior family law
experience). R. 209, l. 3-13; R. 210-15, l. 1-5. Melinda filed her request for a
protective order approximately two months after Michael had filed his petition to
modify the divorce decree. R. 210, l. 21-25. Melinda testified that she
participates in a Tai-Chi class with other women. R. 216, l. 23-25, R. 217, l. 1-2.
6

Melinda testified that she participated in the jogging portion of her children’s
Taekwondo class. R. 217, R. 219, l. 22. Both parties did not honor the special
master’s directive to exchange the children from their residences on occasion. R.
219, l. 14-19. Melinda testified that she was frightened when Michael videotaped
her when he left his residence and approached her vehicle due to Michael’s history
of domestic violence, because of her vulnerable physical condition, and because
he had struck her car violently before. R. 223, l. 22-25; R. 225, l. 19-25; R. 229, l.
17-22; R. 230, l. 1-10, 17-21. She also testified that Michael became so angry
after his military deployment overseas that he would shake with anger, that he was
on medication, and that he had been diagnosed with anxiety. R. 224, l. 1-7.
Michael’s counsel asked Melinda whether Michael had asked Melinda to violate
the special master’s directive by doing child exchanges at a location other than the
parties’ residences. R. 231, l. 14-25. She responded that she did so because
Michael refused to meet at the parties’ residences. R. 231, l. 16. Opposing
counsel speculated that Melinda was feigning to look confused during his crossexamination. R. 239, l. 10-11. Melinda testified that the parties’ 16-year-old
daughter is also frightened of Michael. R. 240, l. 11; p. 110, l. 1. Melinda honked
her horn for Michael to answer the door during the exchange at his residence
because it was cold outside, and her 16-year-old daughter did not have a coat on.
7

R. 241, l. 4-7. She testified that after Michael began videotaping her, her daughter
videotaped Michael while as a passenger in Melinda’s vehicle. R. 242, l. 13-14.
Melinda testified that Michael’s videotaping of her in her vehicle was “creepy as
hell.” R. 243, l. 9. Michael was chasing Melinda around the soccer field during
his parent-time. R. 245, l. 4-7. Michael was yelling at Melinda and
photographing her during the chasing time. R. 245, l. 24-25. The divorce decree
allows the parties to be together at the children’s extracurricular activities and to
be supportive of them. R. 248, l. 11-19. Michael is a six-foot man, and Melinda
was terrified when he stalked her at the soccer practices because he was yelling at
her and recording her while she was trying to coach young girls. R. 248, l. 22-25,
p. 118, l. 1-4. On one occasion with the soccer team, Melinda had to call the
police because Michael was following her around and the parents were all staring.
R. 249, l. 7-12. Michael never attended the children’s activities unless they were
scheduled during his parent-time. R. 249, l. 21-23. The special master’s order
required the parties to communicate during exchanges by text or email. R. 253-54.
Melinda provided consistent testimony about Michael’s blocking of her vehicle.
R. 258-59.
During redirect examination, Melinda testified as follows. Melinda’s first
attorney was hired through the Utah State Bar’s modest means program. R. 261, l.
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19-25; p. 131. This attorney: (1) admitted to Melinda during the evidentiary
hearing before Judge Allphin that he did not know what he was doing; (R. 262, l.
4-8); (2) despite Melinda relating to her attorney that she was being stalked, he
never advised her of her right to obtain a protective order (R. 261, l. 21-25, p. 131,
l. 1-3); and, (3) told Melinda that he did not realize the hearing before Judge
Allphin was an evidentiary hearing (R. 262, l. 17-18). It was her attorney’s first
family law case, and family law was not his field of practice. R. 262, l. 25, p. 132,
l. 2-3. Melinda’s modest means attorney offered limited evidence during the
hearing. R. 263, l. 4. Judge Allphin never made a ruling on the issuance of a
protective order. R. 262, l. 9-13. Melinda did not file a protective order because
the police “brushed her off” when she asked about, and the victim’s advocate
advised that without marks on her body, she could lose and inflame the abuser. R.
263, l. 13-19. The first time Melinda met with Mr. Weckel, he advised her that
she had a basis to obtain a protective order. R. 264, l. 21-23. Prior to that she had
no idea that she could successfully obtain a protective order. R. 265, l. 1. After
Michael’s military deployment, he started getting aggressive. R. 265, l. 20-25.
Melinda also testified that she did not petition for a protective order earlier
because she was trying to preserve the parties’ marriage and had to protect the
children when Michael became increasingly violent. R. 267, l. 22-25, R. 268, l. 19

7. Melinda does not do some of the Tai Chi motions when she attends those
classes and wears her hand braces when she participates. R. 268, l. 5-10. Melinda
doesn’t do about 75% of the Taekwondo workout with her children, does not do
punching, and only participated in this activity to be with her children. R. 268, l.
16-25; p. R. 269, l. 1-13.
Michael testified as follow during his direct examination. After Melinda’s
traumatic brain injury, Michael observed that Melinda could do minor household
tasks. R. 308, l. 8-11. In public, Michael has only observed Melinda not wearing
her wrist braces a couple of times. R. 309, l. 8-10. Michael had asked the special
master to direct the parties to exchange their children at a police station because
Melinda was causing stress to his sister during the exchanges. R. 310, l. 18-20.
Melinda argued with a police officer for over an hour that she was able to conduct
exchanges at Michael’s residence. R. 312, l. 18-20. Melinda emailed Michael and
told him that she was going to do the exchanges at his residence and that she
would “play his games.” R. 313, l. 14-22. Melinda would arrive at Michael’s
house 10-15 minutes earlier generally for exchanges. R. 317, l. 18. Melinda never
left her vehicle to knock on Michael’s door for exchanges. R. 318, l. 5-6.
Melinda told Michael not to videotape her. R. 318, l. 13-18. Michael admitted
that he videotaped Melinda during the exchange which occurred on October 31
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(where Michael left his residence to videotape Melinda in her car). R. 318, l. 2225. Melinda arrived about 15 minutes early on that occasion, honked her horn,
and texted Michael that she was at his residence. R. 319, l. 18-25. Rather than
responding to Melinda’s text, Michael ignored them. R. 320, l. 1-8. Honking of a
car horn is against Michael’s HOA policy. R. 320, l. 16-25. Michael had asked
Melinda to not honk previously, but she has kept doing it. R. 321, l. 1-4. Michael
showed a videotape to the Court which he had taken during the exchange over
Melinda’s objection (because the evidence had not been presented to the
Commissioner, and Melinda had no prior notice of the videotape). The videotape
indicated that Melinda was not ringing Michael’s doorbell; it was the party’s 16year-old daughter while Melinda remained in her car. R. 329, l. 16-23. Rather
than answering the door, Michael put a piece of cotton near the doorbell to mute
the sound because it had become annoying to him and his young son who was
waiting to be picked up. R. 330, l. 1-10. When Michael finally opened the door,
his 16-year-old daughter confronted him about videotaping her. R. 334, l. 6-15.
Ostensibly due to her annoyance with her father, the 16-year-old daughter flipped
her father the bird as she walked away from the door. R. 335, l. 10-11. Michael
admitted that his behavior had made his daughter angry. R. 335, l. 13-14.
Michael videotaped Melinda and his daughter because Melinda had parked in a
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location which could not be seen by Michael’s recording video cameras that he
had installed at his residence, and he wanted to record her. R. 338, l. 1-3. Michael
left his residence to record Melinda and went up to Melinda’s car to video her
because he was afraid Melinda might make false allegations about him as she had
done in the past. R. 338, l. 10-12. While Michael was videotaping Melinda, she
took a photo of him doing that. R. 339, l. 15-17. Melinda then started videotaping
Michael and gave her camera to her daughter to continue as she backed her car out
of a neighbor’s driveway. R. 339, l. 21-22. Michael admits that he left his
residence in violation of the special master’s order to videotape Melinda. R. 342.
It is impossible to view Melinda’s face or body language in Michael’s exhibits 2
and 3 (videotape of incident). Michael indicated that Melinda “ran off” with the
parties’ son during soccer practice during his parent-time. R. 349, l. 3-4. Michael
admitted that he brought his phone with him when he went to the soccer practice
in case he needed it to protect himself against a false accusation made by Melinda.
R. 349, l. 13-18. Michael denied all of Melinda’s stalking allegations. R. 350, l.
8-25. Regarding Melinda’s photo of Michael at soccer practice, Michael did not
intend to threaten Melinda by standing close to her with his camera. R. 352, l. 2325. Michael was standing close to Melinda because it was 10 minutes after
parent-time, and he was supposed to pick up his son. R. 352, l. 16-19. Michael
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admitted that Melinda had asked him to stop photographing her and/or
videotaping her a couple of times, but she never expressed that she was afraid of
him. R. 353, l. 8-21. Initially Michael testified that there was not a restraining
order in the divorce decree; then upon further questioning by his lawyer, he
admitted that there was a restraint not to harass each other. R. 354, l. 14-25, R.
359, l. 1-6. Despite leaving his residence to videotape Melinda during an
exchange, Michael testified that he never has done anything that could be
construed as harassing her. R. 359, l. 7-9. Michael denied slamming the roof to
Melinda’s car. R. 356-57. However, Michael did admit that the police asked him
to leave the residence during that incident. R. 357, l. 23-25. Although not
remembering Melinda’s allegation regarding pushing her, Michael denied ever
laying his hands on her. R. 358, l. 13-25; R. 359, l. 1-7. Michael denied ever
shoving one of his daughters into a bannister. R. 361, l. 20-25. Michael admitted
that he has a strained relationship with the daughter who Melinda alleges he
shoved into a banister (R. 365, l. 9-18), and that daughter testified against him on
behalf of Melinda in the hearing before Judge Allphin. R. 362, l. 1-6. The
daughter also brought up the incident to him. R. 366, l. 23-25. Michael admits
that this incident with his daughter was detrimental to their relationship, but he
alleges that she has gotten over it. R. 366, l. 6-9. Michael denied that he had
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surveilled Melinda at soccer practices except one time. R. 367, l. 8-13. Michael
testified that he took the video because Melinda was taking their son’s clothes
with her. R. 367, l. 15-25. Michael admitted that at the dance festival incident,
Melinda gave her son a hug. R. 374, l. 24. Part of the record was the police report
regarding the incident that he had provided the Commissioner. Michael then
stated that Melinda started to walk off with his son, so he called the police. R.
374, l. 18. Michael denied ever touching Melinda during the dance incident. R.
374, l. 20-24. Regarding the Taekwondo incident, Michael admitted that Melinda
was authorized to be at the activity. R. 377, l. 22-23. Michael denied making any
intimidating gestures toward Melinda while at Taekwondo. R. 378. Michael
admitted that he parked in front of his driveway (which blocked Melinda’s car).
However, he excused this behavior because his garbage can’s placement prevented
him from parking anywhere else convenient. R. 380, l. 24-25. Michael said he
would have been willing to move his car if Melinda had asked him to do so. R.
382, l. 23-24. Michael denied photographing woman’s butts. R. 382, l. 15-19. He
then said he didn’t remember doing it. R. 383, l. 7. Michael testified that he could
not remember if Melinda had called him about taking a naked photo of her. R.
384, l. 3. Despite complaining that Melinda had scheduled soccer during his
parent-time, he admitted that he attended all of the soccer games and practices
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during his parent-time. R. 388, l. 17-25. Based upon a previously undisclosed
email (objected to by Melinda), Michael alleged that Melinda would sit close to
him during soccer games, with their 16-year-old daughter sitting in between them.
R. 389, l. 12-19. Michael’s exhibit 4 notified Michael that she was going to sit
close to him at a soccer game “for the sake of the kids.” R. 392, l. 15-25; R. 393,
l. 1-6. Melinda did not appear to be concerned about proximity when she sat close
to him at soccer games. R. 393, l. 21-23. Melinda alerted the Court that Civil
Rule 108 prohibited the introduction of new evidence unless there had been a
substantial change in circumstances. R. 299, l. 21-25; R. 300, l. 1-8, R. 302, l. 1525; R. 304, l. 1-3. The Court then overruled a specific objection and allowed the
new evidence. R. 391, l. 6-25. Melinda did not object to Michael’s exhibit 4
because the Court had already stated its basis for allowing his first three exhibits.
Michael testified on cross-examination as follows. Melinda requested that
she come to his residence for exchanges because the special master had ordered
her to do so. R. 400, l. 6-7. The special master order required that the parties
remain in their residences during exchanges. R. 401, l. 9-13. Michael let the
doorbell ring for 12-15 minutes during the videotaping exchange on October 31
despite his son asking him if he was going to answer the door. R. 402, l. 2-16.
Michael did not know if Melinda had asked her daughter to continuously ring the
15

doorbell. R. 402, l. 17-21. Although Michael testified that Melinda was honking
her horn incessantly, the video evidence he presented (which Michael admitted
that the video picked up the horn honking), indicated that Melinda only honked
the horn twice during a 12-15 minute period. R. 402, l. 22-25, R. 403, l. 1-12.
Michael testified that he did not know whether Melinda was afraid of him or not
as she sat in her car waiting for her son to come to her vehicle during the exchange
on October 31. R. 404, l. 22. Michael admitted that he intentionally did not
follow the special master’s order to remain in his residence during exchanges. R.
405, l. 4-10. Michael admitted that he surveilled Melinda with a video camera
during this exchange. R. 405, l. 11-15. Michael admitted that his daughter told
him not to videotape her during the exchange. R. 405, l. 16-18. Michael admitted
that he ignored his daughter’s request to stop videotaping her and continued to do
so. Tr. R. 406, l. 20-23. Michael testified that Melinda condones her daughter’s
behavior without any stated foundation of knowledge. R. 406, l. 24-25, R. 407, l.
1-22. Michael admitted that despite Melinda having the right to be at the
Taekwondo class, he immediately called the police on her. R. 411, l. 20-25.
Michael admitted that in the hearing before Judge Allphin Melinda had stated that
she was afraid of Michael. R. 412, l. 11-19. Michael admitted that Melinda had
emailed him and said that she would sit close to him at their son’s soccer games if
16

he did not videotape her. R. 415, l. 12-25, R. 416, l. 1-6. Michael testified that he
couldn’t remember if Melinda had asked to sit close to him because of the sake of
the children. R. 418, l. 1-6. Michael admitted that Melinda did not enter his
residence without permission (where he had been renting), but that the children
would let her into the house. R. 418, l. 13-16, 24-25; R. 419, l. 1-6. When
confronted with a police report (which had been excluded substantively by the
judge) whereby Michael told the investigating officer that he had beat the roof of
Melinda’s car, Michael would not admit that he told the policeman that. R. 422, l.
18-25, R. 423-434, l. 1-18. Michael didn’t know why the police officer did not
state in a police report that he had not told the officer that Melinda had taken their
son from him at the dance recital despite calling 911. R. 434, l. 19-25, R. 435-48,
l. 1-14.
On redirect, Michael testified as follows. He did not answer the doorbell
because it was not the precise time for Melinda to pick up their son. R. 450, l. 1013.
In rebuttal, Melinda testified as follows. Melinda asked to sit next to
Michael at the soccer games to reduce conflict in the best interest of the children.
R. 450, l. 17-25, R. 455, l. 1-6. Melinda stated in her police reports that she was
afraid of Michael. R. 455, l. 18-22. Upon Michael’s return from military
17

deployment, he became much more violent and aggressive. R. 458, l. 16-23.
Melinda did not instruct her daughter to ring the doorbell incessantly; her daughter
left the car because she was excited to see her brother. Melinda called to her to
come back to the car. Melinda texted Michael to answer the door because their
daughter was not wearing a coat, it was cold, and she was shivering. Michael
ignored the texts. R. 459, l. 15-25, R. 460, l. 1. Melinda honked her horn to alert
her daughter to get back in the car. R. 460, l. 5. Melinda was not honking her
horn incessantly. R. 460, l. 10-13. Melinda was frightened of Michael during
exchanges, but she also was frightened not to follow the court’s orders (R. 464, l.
1-10). Melinda did not walk off with her son at the dance recital. The child
sought her out because he had been left alone when Michael left to call the police,
and Melinda left not wanting to create a problem. R. 467, l. 7-15. Melinda
testified that on one occasion Michael came to her house during an exchange,
started yelling, entered her house unlawfully, and threw things out of his car on to
Melinda’s lawn (R. 473, l. 17-25, R. 474, l. 1-24). On another occasion, Michael
called the police during an exchange and started yelling at her parents about
custodial interference and entered her home unlawfully – which frightened her. R.
478, l. 21-25, R. 479-80, l. 1-25. Regarding Michael’s allegation that she had
entered his residence unlawfully, she denied that due to Michael’s threat that he
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would seek a restraining order against him. R. 482, l. 1-6. Michael videotaped her
at the soccer events. R. 483, l. 1-18; R. 484, l. 6-13, R. 485, l. 10-17. Melinda
told Michael to stop recording her because it was frightening her and the children.
R. 486, l. 8-21, R. 487, l. 16-24; R. 488, l. 4-16. Various parents came up to
Melinda during soccer practices and expressed their concerns about Michael. R.
489, l. 11-19. Her Modest Means attorney recommended that she not testify in the
Judge Allphin hearing so she didn’t. R. 490, l. 1-5. Melinda went to a victim’s
advocate’s office to try and get help. R. 492, l. 13-18. During the soccer photo
incident when Michael called the police due to his claim of custodial interference,
the officer told her to contact the victim’s advocate’s office and to get a protective
order. R. 494, l. 6-10; R. 495, l. 9-21. The evidence was relevant to prove
Melinda’s state of mind of fear. R. 495, l. 1-4. Michael lied about not beating the
roof of the car, and the children were present when he did that. R. 499, l. 17-25.
Michael lied about not shoving her down. R. 501, l. 22-25, R. 502, l. 1-4.
Regarding the shoving incident of the parties’ daughter into the bannister, Melinda
saw a bruise on her daughter and described it with particularity. R. 503, l. 25, p.
210, l. 1-4. She also heard Michael swearing and yelling at their daughter during
this incident. R. 506, l. 2-4. Regarding the Taekwondo incident, Michael came
directly at her and she was frightened. R. 506, l. 9-16. When Melinda came out of
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the closet, Michael was there with his camera aiming it at the door to the closet,
ostensibly photographing her. R. 506, l. 22-24, R. 508, l. 10-18. She had been
inside the close for about 10-15 minutes. R. 508, l. 4-8. During this incident,
Melinda was mostly annoyed. R. 508, l. 25, R. 509, l. 1. Michael’s assertion that
he could not park his car anywhere else but his driveway during exchanges was
bogus due to the availability of space on the street. R. 510, l. 7-24. Regarding
Michael photographing her when Melinda was naked, Melinda discovered those
photos on her computer. She complained to Michael about it, and he admitted to
her that he had done that. R. 511, l. 10-25.
Upon re-cross examination, Melinda testified as follows. Melinda agreed to
do exchanges at a police station because Michael kept threatening her unless she
did so. R. 516, l. 22-25. The children told Melinda that they did not want to do
the exchanges at the police station. R. 516, l. 25. Michael told Melinda that he
videotaped her at the soccer events. R. 518, l. 13-15.
B. MATERIAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
The Court sustained Michael’s objection to Melinda’s introduction of three
police reports -- which corroborated her testimony about Michael’s violence due
to an authentication challenge. R. 80, l. 18. These documents had been submitted
to the issuing judge and the Commissioner as exhibits with the petition for a
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protective order. Melinda made an offer of proof that since Michael had not
objected to the police report when she had submitted them to the Commissioner,
he had waived his objection. R. 179, l. 19-25; R. 180-81, l. 1-22. Because of the
Court’s ruling, Melinda did not try to introduce two other police reports as
evidence which were part of the court record by way of the commissioner’s
hearing, although she testified that she had given the police reports to the
commissioner at the hearing. R. 96, l. 1-3; R. 98, l. 20-24. Judge Edwards ruled
that whether Melinda had submitted the police reports to the Commissioner was
irrelevant. R. 99, l. 4-6.
Judge Edwards allowed Michael to introduce new, video, text, and email
evidence at the second hearing – which was never disclosed to Melinda prior to
the second hearing. This was prejudicial because, not being on notice of this
surprise evidence, Melinda did not provide emails which could have supported her
position or rebutted Michael’s assertions. Melinda brought up the unfairness of
the Court’s allowance of this evidence during her closing argument and
throughout the hearing. R. 528, l. 15-25, R. 529, l. 1.
However, prior to the presentation of Michael’s evidence, Michael admitted
that Judge Edwards should consider all evidence presented before the
Commissioner. R. 138, l. 3-4. This was an inconsistent position under the
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principle of equitable estoppel. Melinda further advised the Court that Rule 108
and the Day case (discussed infra) only had to do with getting an independent
ruling, rather than limiting the kind or amount of evidence presented at a Rule 108
hearing. R. 139, l. 15-25, R. 140, l. 1-4.
C. CLOSING ARGUMENT
During closing argument Melinda, citing to Rule 108, argued that it was
unfair for Michael to surprise her with new email and video recording evidence in
a second, evidentiary hearing that occurred 30 days after the first hearing. Tr. P.
234, l. 15-25. Melinda had objected to this evidence earlier on. R. 160-61.
During his closing argument, Michael exploited the fact that Melinda did not have
new, rebuttal documentary evidence to rebut his new evidence. R. 634, l. 10-17;
R. 537, l. 2-3; R. 540, l. 1-20, R. 541, l. 1-16, R. 547, l. 13-18, 21. Michael also
took an inconsistent position by saying because Melinda had not raised the
trespassing issue before the Commissioner, he could not do so before the judge – a
second equitable estoppel claim. R. 553, l. 25 (when he himself had offered new
evidence during the second hearing). During closing argument, Michael alluded
to a private conversation that the judge had with counsel after the first hearing
which is not part of the record. R. 555, l. 9-16. During her closing argument,
Melinda moved to allow an email on her phone to be introduced as rebuttal
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evidence to Michael’s new, email evidence, which had surprised her. R. 556, l.
17-24, R. 557, l. 14-25, R. 558, l. 1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25. The judge denied
Melinda’s motion. R. 558, l. 8-14.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS
The Court used a form to enter its ruling, and did not make specific, written
findings, nor ask counsel to prepare written findings of fact. R. 124-25. However,
it did state its oral findings on the record as follows. The Court found that: (1) the
parties were cohabitants, R. 569, p. 5; (2) no abuse occurred, R. 569, l. 21-24; (3)
no assault occurred, R. 570, l. 25; (4) no harassment occurred, R. 571, l. 12; (5) no
electronic harassment occurred, R. 571, l. 15; (6) voyeurism does not apply
because married persons do not have an expectation of privacy with each other, R.
574, l. 5-20; (7) no trespass occurred, R. 576, l. 18; (8) no child abuse occurred, R.
578, l. 23; (9) no threat of violence occurred, R. 579, l. 3; (10) both parties
violated court rules, R. 580, l. 15; (11) both parties are in the habit of collecting
evidence against each other, R. 580, l. 21; (12) Michael did not engage in a course
of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear, relying on the videos that
Michael presented in the second hearing, R. 583, l. 1-5, 8; (13) subjectively,
Melinda did not fear Michael when she went to pick up her children from his
residence because she did it frequently, R. 583, l. 22-25, 584, l. 1-5; (14) even
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though Michael violated the special master’s order to remain in his residence,
because Michael videotaped Melinda in close proximity to his residence, and
because Melinda slowly backed away with her vehicle (despite wearing braces to
her hands), she was not frightened, R. 584, 1-25; (15) a reasonable person would
not have been frightened, R. 585, l. 1; (16) Melinda did not have a vulnerability
due to her traumatic brain injury, R. 585, l. 16; (17) the Court found dispositive
that the new email evidence Michael had presented in the second hearing proved
that Melinda was not afraid of him. R. 585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 6, R. 588, l. 12-19;
(18) there was some evidence that Melinda was vulnerable. R. 522, l. 19-22.
D. DISPOSITION
The judge vacated the protective order.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Melinda was denied a fair hearing when Judge Edwards bifurcated the
evidentiary hearing under Civil Rule 108 into two hearings. During the second
hearing, Michael presented new, prejudicial evidence by way of a videotape, a
text, and emails which indicated that Melinda was not afraid of him and had asked
to sit next to him at their children’s soccer practice if he would not surveil her.
Although Rule 108(c) allows the Court with discretion to consider new evidence,
the Court did not find that there had been a substantial change in circumstances
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since the hearing before the commissioner, over Melinda’s objections. Secondly,
this civil rule cannot circumvent due process by allowing new evidence to be
presented without adequate notice. The evidentiary hearing was hijacked by
Michael’s successful attempt to introduce evidence by trickery. For these reasons
the verdict should be vacated, and the protective order reinstated as a matter of law
and policy.
Secondly, because the District Court relied exclusively on the new evidence
to find that Michael’s actions did not cause emotional distress under the
individualized objective standard, there is no basis to support the Court’s finding
and dismissal of the protective order if that evidence is disallowed.
ARGUMENT
I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL RULE 108 AND DUE PROCESS REQUIRES
STRIKING PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED MATERIAL
EVIDENCE AND VACATING THE VERDICT.
Civil Rule 108(c) allows a judge to consider evidence which had not been
presented to a commissioner during a Civil Rule 101 hearing, but only if there has
been a substantial change in circumstances. Despite Melinda’s repeated
objections to the introduction of new evidence, and claiming surprise and
unfairness throughout the second, evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed Michael
to introduce materially prejudicial and previously undisclosed evidence and made
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no finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances. Michael
introduced new email, text, and videotape evidence, which also had never been
presented to the Commissioner. Therefore, it is clear that the judge erred in
allowing Michael’s emails, texts, and videotape to be introduced during the
second, evidentiary hearing because he never ruled that there had been a
substantial change in circumstances. The judge may have considered the evidence
dispositive because it tended to show that Melinda subjectively was not afraid of
Michael, and that a reasonable person may not have been afraid of him. The Court
used that evidence to make that finding. R. 585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 1-15, R. 588, l.
12-19.
In Day v. Barnes, 2018 UT App. 143, 427 P.3d 1272, the Court of appeals
stated that a civil rule should be interpreted based upon its plain language. Id. at
1275, P15. Day also stands for the proposition that in the context of a Rule 108
objection, the judge must make independent findings on both the evidence and the
law, and that the rule should be read as a whole. Id. at 1276, P19. Day goes on to
say that Rule 108(b) requires a party to identify exactly what part of the
proceeding a party is objecting to. Id. This language implies that the nonobjecting party must have fair notice as to what evidence or legal principle was
misapplied by the commissioner so that she can prepare for the evidentiary hearing
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and/or oral argument if the judge orders either. Here, Michael’s written objection
neither mentioned the evidence which he introduced at the second hearing, nor did
it state how such evidence should apply to the law. Consequently, the second
evidentiary hearing was effectively a trial by ambush and was fundamentally
unfair. Due process is a second legal principal by which the undisclosed evidence
should be stricken, and the verdict overturned.
Nevertheless, once errors have been identified on appeal, Melinda has the
additional burden to prove that the errors were not harmless. Horrell v. Utah
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (UT App. 1996). An error is not
harmless if but for the error, the probability of a different outcome is sufficiently
high so that it undermines the appellate court’s confidence in the outcome. Id.
Here, the judge relied heavily on the videotape, text, and email evidence that had
been introduced during the second part of the evidentiary hearing. R. 583-86.
Indeed, this new evidence was the dispositive factor for the judge’s ruling. R.
585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 1-15, R. 588, l. 12-19. That is, the judge found that
Melinda was subjectively not afraid of Michael, because, among other things, and
according to Michael’s email, she was not afraid to sit close to him with the
parties’ children at another child’s soccer matches. The judge also found that such
evidence indicated that a reasonable person would not have been afraid. R. 586, l.
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16-21. Therefore, the undisclosed, new evidence was without a doubt materially
prejudicial.
Melinda attempted to save the day by scrambling to present new evidence
during her closing argument. She hurriedly scanned her phone during the second
hearing, and discovered a single, rebuttal email after she had just finished
testifying in rebuttal. R. 556, l. 17-25; R. 558, l. 1-6. R. 556, l. 17-24, R. 557, l.
14-25, R. 558, l. 1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25. However, when Melinda tried to present
this single piece of rebuttal evidence to the judge, her motion to do so was denied
as out of time. R. 558, l. 8-14. Thus, Melinda had notified the court that such
rebuttal evidence existed. Indeed, Melinda had testified during her rebuttal
testimony that such rebuttal evidence existed because she stated that there were
other emails and texts which rebutted Michael’s testimony. R. 453, l. 24-25; R.
454-455, l. 1-12. Those emails and texts could have corroborated her testimony
that in a public place, with a promise that Michael would not photograph, record,
or surveil her, a reasonable person’s fear of stalking would be significantly
mitigated – particularly in the context of a mother who had a motivation to try and
protect her children from undue stress in a high conflict divorce context. R. 515;
R. 518, l. 14. As stated, Melinda testified during the course of the second hearing
about other emails sent by Michael to her which could have impeached his
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testimony about not surveilling Melinda and/or about the extent to which he did
surveil her, and/or how such surveillance impacted a reasonable person. R. 485, l.
10-11; R. 486, l. 14-21. Furthermore, past stalking events which induced fear
would have no bearing on the more recent proposal of Melinda to sit close to
Michael publicly at a soccer match with her children if he promised not to
continue to surveil her. Thus, this additional email and text evidence, other
evidence yet to be thought about and/or produced by Melinda in rebuttal and
providing counsel with sufficient time to assess and plan his arguments regarding
the undisclosed evidence could have been dispositive to the judge’s ruling.
Fundamental fairness certainly required such an opportunity. Melinda advised the
Court repeatedly about the unfair prejudice she was experiencing by introducing
this evidence at the hearing. R. 472, l. 14, R. 528, l. 20-23. The Court’s error was
exacerbated by Michael who referred to the undisclosed emails during his closing
argument as dispositive evidence, R. 541, l. 11, and then argued that because the
emails were in existence prior to the second hearing, and because Melinda had
knowledge of the emails generally, springing them upon her during the second
hearing was not prejudicial to her. R. 557, l. 9. Indeed, it is clear that the judge
bought Michael’s argument because he used Michael’s identical reasoning in
dismissing Melinda’s cogent, stalking claim. R. 585, l. 21-25; R. 586, l. 1-21.
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Therefore, Civil Rule 108 requires that the undisclosed evidence be stricken, and
the verdict overturned. See elaboration of this point infra.
Secondly, from a policy perspective, Civil Rule 108 should state that if a
party wishes to introduce new evidence which had not been presented before the
commissioner, that party needs to provide notice of his intent to introduce such
evidence by filing a motion with the court to allow the evidence, and that the
movant has the burden of proof to show that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances. Civil Rule 108 does not state any procedure for how such evidence
should be introduced to the judge. Without clarity, there is always a chance that a
party may surreptitiously introduce new evidence before the judge as an
afterthought, further clogging the appellate court’s docket on appeal as here, and
rendering the Commissioner hearing virtually meaningless.
Additionally, since there is a choice between overturning the verdict
outright or remanding the case so that Melinda may present rebuttal evidence,
policy, legal, and equitable considerations require the former option. That is,
when a party introduces late filed evidence in the civil context, the proper remedy
as a matter of law generally is to strike the evidence. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2005
UT App. 541, 127 P.3d 1256. Furthermore, from an equitable perspective, doing
otherwise would be the equivalent to rewarding Michael’s afterthought approach,
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and placing a burden on Melinda with having to respond to the undisclosed
evidence.
Additionally, like the losing party in Pratt, Michael himself created the
problem which he now faces. That is, he had thirty days between the first and
second hearings – plenty of time to file a motion with the court, or to simply
provide Melinda with a copy of his new exhibits. He did neither. Therefore, there
are legal, equitable, and policy reasons to simply overturn the verdict.
As a consolation prize, the case should be remanded to the judge to at least
afford Melinda the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
II.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT
MICHAEL DID NOT CAUSE MELINDA EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
UNDER AN INDIVIDUALIZED OBJECTIVE STANDARD.

In Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, 322 P.3d 728, 735, this Court stated that a
Court must consider a victim’s vulnerabilities under the emotional distress prong
of Utah’s protective order statute. It also held that a victim must prove that the
victimizer caused a significant amount of psychological suffering in his course of
conduct to find that the protective order should be issued under the emotional
distress prong of the statute. Id. at 738.
Here, the Court made two findings related to fear and emotional distress
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under the individualized objective standard articulated in Baird which indicate
that the Court’s ruling is clearly erroneous. First, the Court concluded that
Michael’s course of conduct amounted to stalking generally. R. 581, l. 21-25; R.
582, l. 1-10. The Court then inferred that because Melinda slowly backed out of
Michael’s driveway while he came close to her car to videotape her in violation of
the special master’s order during a parent-time exchange, Melinda, under the
individualized objective standard set forth in Baird was not afraid to be in
Michael’s presence. R. 584, l. 5-13; R 587, l. 12-22. However, Melinda testified
that she went to Michael’s residence as required by court order to pick up her
children. A parent should not be denied a protective order simply because she is
trying to enjoy a fundamental liberty interest. The Court also failed to consider
how Melinda’s traumatic brain injury and hand braces may have prevented her
from fleeing the scene quickly. For example, it is clear that the Court failed to
consider how Michael’s disobedience of the special master’s order to remain in
his residence impacted a stalked, disabled individual – particularly when the
victim thought it important to obey the court order as Melinda did, and how it
would create fear when Michael did not obey the order. R. 460, l. 8; R. 522, l. 21.
Also, despite finding some evidence that Melinda was vulnerable, the Court failed
to connect that vulnerability with the evidence. R. 522, l. 18-22.
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Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the only evidence that the
Court used under the emotional distress prong of the protective order statute was
the undisclosed emails indicating that Melinda would “play Michael’s games,” and
sit close to him at public soccer matches if he would not stalk her. R. 585, l. 2125; R. 586, l. 1-21. If this Court throws that evidence out, then there is no
evidence to support the Court’s finding on the emotional distress prong of the
statute. This seems particularly appropriate because when Melinda asked for
clarification as to the Court’s ruling after it had entered its findings, the Court, in
citing to Baird, omitted the part of that opinion which states that a Court must
consider the particular vulnerabilities of the victim. R. 587, l. 12-22. Therefore,
since the Court found that stalking occurred, the protective order should be
reinstated on the remaining evidence and findings, even in the light most favorable
to Michael on the emotional distress prong and if the new evidence is stricken.
CONCLUSION
Civil Rule 108 and fundamental fairness require that the order in this case
be vacated. The protective order should be reinstated. Alternatively, the case
should be remanded so that Melinda may have a fair opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence to the new evidence presented by Michael in the second
evidentiary hearing.
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